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While privatization of state-owned enterprises has been one of the most important aspects of the
economic transition from a centrally planned to a market system, no transition economy has
privatized all its firms simultaneously. This raises the question of whether governments privatize
firms strategically. In this paper we examine the determinants of the sequencing of privatization. To
obtain testable predictions about the factors that may affect sequencing, we investigate the following
competing government objectives: (i) Maximizing efficiency through resource allocation; (ii)
maximizing public goodwill from the free transfers of shares to the public; (iii) minimizing political
costs; (iv) maximizing efficiency through information gains; and (v) maximizing privatization
revenues. Next, we use firm-level data from the Czech Republic to test the competing predictions
about the sequencing of privatization. Consistent with the hypotheses of a government priority on
revenues and public goodwill, we find strong evidence that more profitable firms were privatized first.
The sequencing of privatization is also consistent with maximizing efficiency through information
gains. Our results indicate that many empirical studies of the effects of privatization on firm
performance suffer from a selection bias.
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While the privatization of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) has been one of the most
important aspects of economic transition from a centrally planned to a market system, no
government has privatized all its SOEs simultaneously. Even in countries that strove to
privatize rapidly, (e.g., the Czech Republic, Estonia, Russia, and the Ukraine), the process
consisted of a sequence of moves, with some firms being privatized earlier than others.
A government may sequence privatization of SOEs for a number of reasons. First, it
may incur excessively high congestion and transaction costs if it tries to privatize all firms
simultaneously. This was clearly a factor in the transition economies, such as the Czech
Republic, Hungary, and Poland, and it is also true for countries with large state-owned
sectors in other parts of the world, such as Brazil, China, and India. Second, a government
may sequence privatization to reveal information about the firms to investors. If firms are
sold sequentially, later buyers can observe the quality of the firms sold earlier. This
informational advantage of sequencing is particularly relevant in transition economies
since they were closed off from the rest of the world and there is usually a high degree of
uncertainty about the quality of the firms being privatized.
Third, sequencing may occur because of political opposition to dramatic reforms (the
case in Bulgaria, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia), and it may even increase the feasibility
of future reforms (Dewatripont and Roland, 1995).1 Fourth, instantaneous privatization
may lead to costly unemployment and hence the optimal privatization path may be
gradual (Aghion and Blanchard, 1994; Katz and Owen, 1993).
Given that governments are likely to privatize sequentially, the question arises as to
which firms they will choose to privatize first. To address this issue, we describe several
theories that encompass different possible government objectives. The theories yield
different predictions about the government’s sequencing strategy. Since the governments in
transition economies usually pursued several goals simultaneously (see e.g., World Bank,
1996), we do not assume that the government had a single objective. Rather, we allow for
the fact that the government could have several objectives and ask which one(s) received
considerable weight.2
We then examine these predictions using data on the population of manufacturing firms
sold in the first two waves of the Czech large-scale privatization program. We start by
looking at the decision of a government maximizing Pareto efficiency. It is generally
argued that the least efficient or profitable firms are the best candidates for privatization
from an efficiency perspective since they have the greatest need for restructuring. For
example, Frydman et al. (1999) and Claessens et al. (1997) find that efficiency
improvements are greatest in firms with lower initial levels of efficiency. Hence, the
economic model of a government guided by the principle of increasing Pareto efficiency
predicts that the government will privatize the least efficient firms first.3 Second, if the
privatization procedure involves transferring equity shares to citizens, the government is
likely to privatize the best (most profitable) firms first so that the shares transferred to
citizens are valuable, thereby building political support for the government.1See Roland (2000) for a recent survey of the literature on sequencing of reforms.
2The multiple objectives may be nested in an overall objective function (see Section 2.6 below).
3As discussed in the following section, this argument assumes that the transaction costs associated with
privatizing loss-making firms are not so negative as to outweigh the efficiency gains of privatizing such firms.
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government is concerned about the political cost of unemployment since these firms are
likely to lay off fewer workers than the inefficient and loss-making firms. A related
hypothesis concerning political costs is that the government is less likely to privatize firms
in industries that already have employment difficulties. Fourth, when the benefit from
privatization is informational in the sense that private firms use and process information
more efficiently than government-owned firms, the government may sequence privatization
to maximize the flow of information in the economy. In this context Glaeser and
Scheinkman (1996), hereafter GS, argue that privatization should begin in those sectors
and parts of the supply chain (i) where there is the most uncertainty and (ii) that transmit
the most information to other sectors.4 Finally, the government may want to maximize sale
revenues. To do so, the government may temporarily keep monopolies intact when selling
them to get a higher price. (This was the case with fixed-line telephone companies in a
number of Central and East European countries.) However, as GS point out, selling
monopolies first can decrease economic efficiency. Finally, in the presence of asymmetric
information, we show that the government will sell the most profitable firms first if its
objective is to maximize revenues from the sale.
From the published surveys of the privatization literature (Megginson, 2005; Megginson
and Netter, 2001; Djankov and Murrell, 2002), it appears that the majority of studies have
found a positive link between privatization and firm performance. Our results suggest that
studies that treat the sequencing of privatization as random are likely to overstate the
positive effect of privatization on performance. The most recent survey of privatization in
transition economies (Estrin et al., 2007) evaluates studies that measure the effects of
privatization by their methodology and strongly supports our point.
This is the first study to investigate firm characteristics that are likely to determine the
sequencing of privatization. In a recent book that extensively surveys the privatization
literature, Megginson (2005) mentions two other studies that empirically examine
sequencing in privatization. Specifically, Perotti and Guney (1993) show that state
holdings are sold gradually in order to build confidence among investors, and Dyck (1997)
shows that East Germany’s privatization program was subject to few political constraints
and that companies were speedily sold to the highest bidders. None of the studies
mentioned show that better firms are sold first, or indeed any of the other results of our
paper (Megginson, 2005, pp. 74–75).
By identifying the nature of sequencing of privatization, our analysis contributes to a
better understanding of the behavior of governments and firms. Further, the objectives and
issues we consider are relevant for the transition economies as well as East Asian, South
Asian, African, and Latin American economies that still have sizable state sectors and are
pursuing privatization.
Using data on the population of large- and medium-sized manufacturing firms
privatized in two successive waves in the Czech Republic (a model economy that started
the transition almost completely state-owned), we investigate the priorities of the
government. We find strong evidence that the Czech government privatized more
profitable firms, and firms with large market shares, first. This outcome is consistent with4Many firms in the transition economies faced substantial uncertainty because of the collapse of product and
input markets after the break-up of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), the common trading
area of the Soviet bloc.
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It is also consistent with minimizing political costs, but our data do not support the
secondary hypothesis of this model that industry labor market conditions were an
important determinant of privatization.
Our results also allow us to rule out the hypothesis that improving Pareto efficiency was
a key objective of the government. Finally, our results contradict the prediction of the GS
model that firms with market power should be privatized later, when competitive
conditions and adequate regulatory institutions have been established. However, we find
that the privatization process was consistent with the other recommendation of the GS
model, namely that privatization should start where demand or cost volatility is the
greatest and where it maximizes the flow of information. In particular, we find that firms
likely to be more responsive to changes in demand conditions were privatized first.
Our paper is organized in four additional sections: In Section 2 we describe five models
of government priorities that would lead to particular sequencing strategies in
privatization. In Section 3 we describe the institutional framework of the large-scale
privatization program in the Czech Republic.5 In Section 4 we use firm-level data from the
Czech Republic to test the predictions of the theoretical models. Section 5 concludes the
paper.
2. The government’s objectives in privatization
In privatization programs across the world, governments have chosen to privatize firms
sequentially rather than all at once. The governments are likely to sequence the
privatization of firms because of the high costs associated with selling all firms at once.
These costs may be divided into (i) congestion costs, assumed to be common to all firms
and increasing with the number of firms to be privatized and (ii) transaction costs that vary
with firm characteristics such as performance. Congestion costs relate to the capacity of the
government bureaucracy to process large amounts of information and decisions, and they
dictate that in mass privatizations the government will not privatize all the firms at once.
The transaction costs will affect the decision to privatize some firms before others.6 Under
standard assumptions the government will first privatize firms with the highest net benefits
(gross benefits minus transaction costs), and will privatize firms until the marginal benefit
of privatizing one more firm is less than the marginal congestion costs in that period.
Our discussions with policy makers indicate that transaction costs were relatively limited
and consisted mainly of (i) the costs of acquiring information about the firms and
conducting the sale, and (ii) the restructuring costs of preparing firms for privatization.
The Czech government for instance spent little on preparing firms for sale, leaving
restructuring to the new owners. The transaction costs of acquiring information is also
reported to have been limited as the Communist accounting system enforced uniform data
collection and reporting requirements for all firms, irrespective of performance. Moreover,
the managers of each SOE were required to prepare a privatization proposal providing the5The large-scale privatization program privatized virtually all medium- and large-size firms in the Czech
Republic. The program had several components, including distribution of shares to citizens at large and direct as
well as sealed bid sales to foreign and domestic investors.
6Transaction costs may also vary across the different privatization waves. If they decrease over time, for
example, this may affect the number of firms sold in each wave. However, it will not affect the impacts of the
independent variables on the index function for privatization that we estimate below.
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available to all prospective bidders who were in fact required to attach it to their bids (see
Kotrba, 1995, p. 167).7 Further, the government was well informed about the market
performance of all firms since financial performance prior to privatization already reflected
the effects of price and trade liberalization, and the government also knew the extent of
subsidies it provided to each firm. Hence, these information costs of privatization were
limited and unlikely to be highly correlated with firm performance.
One may argue that the government has to spend more time establishing the value of a
poorly rather than a well performing firm. This would make transaction costs negatively
correlated with firm performance before privatization. However, institutional and
empirical evidence also suggests that international investors usually went after the better
firms (Sabirianova et al., 2005) and used expensive lawyers and consultants in preparing
the bids and executing the negotiations. In many of these cases the government also
contracted with expensive international business consultants. On the other hand, the
government tended to rely on local (less expensive) expertise in the case of bids by domestic
investors for ‘‘less valuable’’ firms. This component of transaction costs is likely to be
positively correlated with firm performance. The same positively and negatively correlated
categories of transaction costs apply to the acquisition of information by the buyers.8 Since
there are no reliable data on the relative magnitudes of these components, we proceed with
the premise that transaction costs may be weakly correlated with firm performance and
that this correlation may be positive or negative.
In the subsections below we develop predictions arising out of the different objectives
that the government may pursue in the privatization process.2.1. Maximizing Pareto efficiency
In this section we investigate the sequencing decision of a government concerned with
increasing economic efficiency through privatization. We note that efficiency considera-
tions may also dictate shutting down unviable firms. Indeed, prior to the start of the
privatization program, the Czech government liquidated some firms that were found to be
unviable (Hashi et al., 1997).
Assuming that privatization will improve the efficiency of firms, and that congestion
costs dictate that firms will not be sold all at once, will a government concerned with
efficiency maximization sell more or less efficient firms first? Investigating the effect of
privatization on firm performance in transition economies, Claessens et al. (1997) and
Frydman et al. (1999) find that the most inefficient firms experience the greatest
improvement in efficiency. This suggests that a government concerned with maximizing
efficiency should privatize the least efficient firms first.9
In our empirical work we look at two proxies for efficiency: (i) Profitability and (ii) the
disparity between labor’s marginal product and wage. Regarding the first, in their study of
the effects of privatization Frydman et al. (1999) show that firms with higher initial levels
of production costs experience the greatest reduction in costs, which suggests that7Since all firms behaved this way, the cost to firms of providing this information is not relevant to the decision
of which firms to privatize first.
8Buyers’ costs also will be relevant whenever the government is concerned with efficiency.
9This assumes that transaction costs are not too negatively correlated with firm performance.
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also be inefficient, the least profitable or loss-making firms are likely to be the most in need
of efficiency enhancing investments (Kikeri et al., 1992). Put another way, since
unprofitable firms are likely to be the furthest from the efficiency frontier for their
industry, it is reasonable to argue that they are likely to benefit the most from private
ownership. For example, in India the government has ruled out the privatization of
profitable firms because they claim that there are no efficiency considerations for doing so.
Moreover, unprofitable firms that are not shut down require government subsidies to keep
them afloat, leading to a misallocation of scarce public resources that could be used for
growth enhancing programs such as infrastructure investment. Thus, the prediction with
respect to the profitability measure is that a government concerned with maximizing
efficiency should privatize more loss-making firms first.
With respect to the second measure of efficiency, the government should first privatize
firms in which wages greatly exceed the marginal product of labor. In our data set, we
observe the average rather than marginal product of labor for each firm. However, since
the two productivities are positively correlated, and are proportional to one another in
production functions such as Cobb–Douglas, we use the difference between the average
product of labor and the average wage in each firm as an alternative proxy for firm
inefficiency.102.2. Maximizing public goodwill
In many transition economies, shares of firms were transferred at a highly subsidized
rate to citizens. For instance, the Czech Republic, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Russia,
Slovakia, Slovenia, and Ukraine used the voucher privatization method to transfer shares.
Privatization through vouchers helped alleviate public concerns that privatization enriches
only a few individuals and generated public support for the government and its current and
future reforms.11 Moreover, in the 1990s the average tenure of the governments in most
Central European countries was about 2 years; hence, governments were likely to be quite
sensitive to sequencing privatization in such a way as to maximize voter goodwill.
As mentioned above, congestion costs dictate that in large privatizations the government
will sequence the sale of firms. It is reasonable to argue that the public will value profitable
firms more, so a government interested in maximizing public support for the reforms is
likely to privatize the more profitable firms first.2.3. Minimizing political costs
Governments are likely to be acutely aware of the political costs of layoffs that will
accompany privatization. It follows that the government will prefer to privatize first those
SOEs that are likely to shed the fewest workers. If political costs depend only on layoffs in10Ideally we would like measures of profitability under capitalism and measures of externality costs, such as
pollution, that the firm produces.
11The launching of privatization in most transition economies was typically accompanied by a public relations
campaign to generate goodwill for the government. For example, in the Czech Republic each voucher book
displayed the signature of the Prime Minister, indicating clearly to whom the citizens should be grateful for their
newly acquired wealth.
ARTICLE IN PRESS
N. Gupta et al. / European Economic Review 52 (2008) 183–208 189the privatized firms, the government should privatize the more profitable and efficient
firms first since these firms are likely to have less surplus employment.
We also investigate whether firms in declining industries facing low employment growth
are likely to be privatized later. This latter prediction potentially allows us to distinguish
between the political cost model and the models of public goodwill and revenue
maximization discussed in this section.12
In our data, we test whether the more profitable firms, firms in which the difference
between the average product of labor (proxying for labor’s marginal product) and the
wage is higher, and firms in low employment growth industries are more likely to be
privatized first.
2.4. Maximizing efficiency due to informational gains
GS have been the only authors to theoretically address sequencing, and their paper
examines sequencing strategies that would increase the efficiency of SOEs. They argue that
a primary advantage of private ownership is that it enhances efficiency by improving firms’
acquisition of, and responsiveness to, information about demand shocks and input costs.
The basic assumption of their model is that private firms respond to demand and cost
shocks, but this information is unobserved or ignored by SOEs.13 Specifically, SOEs
produce a fixed level of output based on the expected values of demand and cost, while
private owners observe the actual values and adjust their production when demand and
cost conditions change. This assumption is justified in centralized or planned economies
where government bureaucrats who lack the incentive to invest in industry-specific
information are involved in the production decisions of SOEs. Even if SOE managers are
equally well informed as the private sector, these managers are required to pursue
objectives in addition to profit maximization, such as fulfilling output and employment
quotas, which would reduce their flexibility to respond to market shocks. GS argue that
given political interference, soft budget constraints, weak managerial incentives for
gathering information, and the absence of stock market monitoring of SOEs, only
privatization would allow these firms to make profit-maximizing decisions in response to
fluctuations in market conditions.
Hence, if the government is concerned about increasing efficiency in the sense of
improving the responsiveness of SOEs to fluctuations in market conditions, the GS model
predicts that privatization should begin where demand or cost volatility is the greatest and
where it maximizes the flow of information.
In the GS model there are three sectors: Upstream, downstream and retail. In our
analysis, we test two predictions of the model pertaining to the sequencing of privatization
across industries. First, GS argue that when demand uncertainty is greater than cost
uncertainty, downstream industries should be privatized before upstream industries,
because downstream industries are better positioned to transmit information between the
retail and upstream sectors. When the retail sector is private, GS show that privatizing12While we would like to include unemployment in the region where the firm is located as a proxy for the
government’s sensitivity to the political cost of unemployment, we do not observe the locations of the firms’
plants.
13SOEs may be less responsive because in centrally planned regimes these firms fulfill a production plan that is
not necessarily consistent with market conditions. However, it is not necessary to assume that they ignore these
shocks as long as private firms observe these shocks with greater accuracy.
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information between the private upstream and the private retail sectors is not disrupted by
the intermediate state-owned downstream sector.
Second, GS argue that industries experiencing the highest demand or cost volatility
should be privatized first, since firms in these industries need to respond to changing
market conditions and hence are likely to benefit the most from privatization. Many
transition economies faced a collapse in product markets due to the break-up of the Soviet-
era trading system. Since demand fluctuations were the main source of volatility in these
economies, GS’s model predicts that industries which were most affected by the collapse of
the Soviet common market should be privatized first. GS also note that the informational
gains from privatization may be offset by a loss of consumer surplus if firms with
significant market power are privatized and allowed to engage in monopoly pricing.
The GS model provides a different set of predictions than have been obtained in the
previous models. In the empirical section we test whether downstream industries and
industries that faced the greatest demand shocks were privatized first. We also test if the
market share of a firm affects the probability of it being privatized early. If the government
maximizes public goodwill or privatization revenues (Section 2.5), firms with high market
share should be privatized first since this variable may also act as a proxy for
profitability.14 Thus, the market share variable also allows us to compare the relative
priority placed on revenue and public goodwill vs. efficiency.
2.5. Maximizing revenues in the presence of asymmetric information
In the Czech Republic, the government raised $8 billion in privatization revenues (World
Bank, 1999). In this section we therefore consider a model where one of the government’s
objectives in terms of the framework of Section 2 is to maximize privatization revenues in
the presence of asymmetric information between the government and prospective investors
about the potential value of the firms. Firms chosen for privatization may have
characteristics that are unobservable to buyers, but are correlated with the value or
profitability of the firms.15 Given this objective, the question then arises as to whether the
government should privatize the better or worse firms first.
We assume that the government knows the long-term profitability of the firm, but
buyers do not.This may be justified on the basis that not much was known about these
firms by outsiders prior to the collapse of the Soviet bloc. It is also consistent with Perotti
(1995), who assumes that buyers are less informed than the government because of
uncertainty regarding future policies that may affect the value of firms.14Unfortunately we only observe market share at the two-digit industry level, while it would be preferable to
have market share at the three-digit level. If one made the simplifying assumption that each firm’s two-digit share
is a constant fraction of its three-digit share, the market share coefficient will be biased upwards (since the
independent variable is biased downward) but elasticities based on this coefficient and the test statistic for it will
not be affected. If, as one would expect, each firm’s three-digit market share is not a constant multiple of the two-
digit share, we will also have an errors in variables problem. This will tend to bias the coefficient towards zero
(abstracting from the scale effect) and elasticities and test statistics will now be biased toward zero overall, making
it harder to reject the null hypothesis that the coefficient is zero.
15In a complementary paper, this problem is examined using an auction framework by Chakraborty et al.
(2006).
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firms’ long-term profits are given by yA;B 2 Y ¼ fy; y¯g, and y can take on either of the two
values with y¯4 y. The two firms can be of the same type or of different types; the type of
the firm is denoted by its profit. We assume that all the buyers observe public information
about the average profitability of the firms. To simplify issues, we assume that different
groups of buyers bid in each period, although second period buyers observe the quality of
the first period firm. Since there is uncertainty about firm type, the value of the firm to all
buyers is given by the expected profits of the firm.
The timing of the game is as follows: The types (profits) yi of the firms are assigned by
nature, the government observes the types and picks firm A or firm B to be sold in the first
period, and the firm is sold at a price equal to its expected value. In the second period,
buyers observe the type of the first firm and then bid for the second firm.
To simplify notation, let A be the firm being sold in the first period and B be the firm
sold second. We specify the following probability distribution for the firms’ profits:
pðyA ¼ y¯; yB ¼ y¯Þ ¼ pðyA ¼ y; yB ¼ yÞ ¼ a
and
pðyA ¼ y¯; yB ¼ yÞ ¼ pðyA ¼ y; yB ¼ y¯Þ ¼ b,
where a; b 2 ð0; 1Þ and 2(a+b) ¼ 1.
Next we calculate the prices offered for each firm under the two sets of buyer beliefs
about the government’s sequencing strategy.
(a) Buyers believe that the government will sell the better firm first.
The probability that the first firm will be of high value, given that buyers’ believe that the
government will sell the better firm first, is given by a+2b. The price offered for the firm
sold in the first period, p1, is the expected value of the firm given these buyer beliefs and is
equal to
p1 ¼ E yAð jyAXyBÞ ¼ p1 ¼ y¯ðaþ 2bÞ þ y a. (1)
Given that buyers think the seller will sell the better firm first, buyers believe that the first
firm is of low value if and only if both the firms are of low value.
In the second period, buyers observe the quality of the first firm. Correspondingly, the
price p2 for the second firm, conditional on the value of the first firm, is given by
p2 ¼
y¯aþ 2b y
aþ 2b if the buyer observes yA ¼ y¯;




When the second period buyers observe a high value firm first, conditional on their beliefs
that the better firm is sold first, they believe that the probability of the second firm being
high value as well equals a, while the probability of the second firm being low value equals
2b. However, if they observe that the first firm is of low value, given that they expect the
government to sell the best firm first, they will conclude that the second firm must be low
value as well. Using Eqs. (1) and (2) it is straightforward to show that the payoff from
selling the good firm first is greater than the payoff from deviating. Hence, when the buyers
believe that the better firm will be sold first, it is an equilibrium strategy for the government
to lead with the best firm. To see the intuition, suppose that the buyers believe that the
government will lead with the better firm, but the government deviates and sells the worse
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and conclude that the second firm is of equal or lower quality. As a result, the second
period price will be lower than if the government had kept to the strategy of selling the
better firm first.
(b) Buyers believe that the government will sell the worse firm first.
As in the previous case, the first period price is the expected value of the firm given
buyers’ beliefs and is equal to
EðyAjyApyBÞ ¼ y¯aþ ðaþ 2bÞ y . (3)
The second period price depends on the realization of yA (the observed value of the first
period firm) and is given by
p2 ¼
y¯ if the buyer observes yA ¼ y¯;
2by¯þ a y




It follows from Eqs. (3) and (4) that the payoff from deviating is higher than the payoff
from following, and the government will always choose to deviate when the buyers believe
that it will sell the worst firm first. Therefore, it cannot be equilibrium for the buyers to
believe that the government will sell the worst firm first. To see this, suppose that buyers
believe that the government will lead with the worst firm, and instead the government
deviates and sells the better firm first. In this case, second period buyers observe the high
quality of the first firm, and given their beliefs about the government’s strategy, they
conclude that the second firm is of equal quality. Thus, second period buyers pay a higher
price than they would if the government had sold the worse firm first. The pure strategy
equilibrium in this model is for the government to lead with the more profitable firm.16
This general question of whether the best or worst good should be sold first arises
whenever a seller has some private information about the quality of the goods and is
concerned about the effect of previous sales on buyer expectations. The model described
above shows that first impressions matter, leading to a best foot forward strategy in
equilibrium.
In the majority of privatizations, governments often retain an ownership stake in the
firms. For example, the Czech government held on to some shares of the companies
privatized in the first round for the explicit purpose of selling the shares later. The
equilibrium results do not change if the model is generalized to the case where the
government retains an ownership stake in the firms. It can also be shown that under
reasonable parameter values, a best foot forward strategy is the unique pure strategy
equilibrium if, in the first period, the government retains the profits from the firm it does
not sell.
In the empirical section, we test this model by investigating whether more profitable
firms are sold in the first wave of privatization. Specifically, we use the difference between
firm output and the wage bill, the difference between the value of the average product of
labor and the wage, firm market share, and firm (accounting) profits as measures of firm
profitability.16This assumes that transaction costs are not too positively correlated with firm performance.
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In this section we show how government may take multiple objectives into account and
how this translates into our empirical framework. Let UR be the Von Neumann–Morgen-
stern utility that the government derives from privatization revenue, Ug be its utility from
the goodwill that it obtains from the population at large, UE be the utility it derives from
improving efficiency, and UC be the utility it obtains from avoiding political costs.
Following Svejnar (1982, 1986), one can view government decision-making as reflecting the
following overall objective function
U ¼ U gRR U gEE U gGG U gCC , (5)
where each giX0 is the weight that the government places on objective i. The objective
function nests as special cases situations where the government has only one objective. For
instance, when the government has revenue maximization as its sole objective,
gE ¼ gG ¼ gC ¼ 0 and U ¼ UR.17
To see how the government will choose firms to be privatized in this framework, suppose
the government replaces a candidate firm to be privatized by a more profitable one. This
substitution will decrease utility from increasing efficiency, while it will increase utility from
higher revenues and public goodwill, and lower political costs. Thus, if the government
chooses to privatize the more profitable firms first, this does not imply that the government
puts zero weight on increasing efficiency. Instead, the increase in utility from the efficiency
gains of privatizing unprofitable firms is outweighed by the gains from privatizing the more
profitable firms first.18
3. The Czech privatization program
In January 1990 the Czech Republic, as part of the former Czechoslovakia, started its
transition to a market economy from a position of virtually total state ownership. In 1989
only 1.2% of the labor force and 2% of all registered assets belonged to the private sector,
and in 1990 only 4% of the gross domestic product was attributed to the private sector
(Dyba and Svejnar, 1995). Yet, by the end of 1995, about 75% of all assets had been
privatized as a result of three main initiatives.
First, between 1990 and 1991, shops, restaurants, housing, and other properties valued
between $2.5 billion and $4.2 billion were restituted to previous owners. Second, between
1991 and 1993, small firms in retail trade, catering, and other services were privatized in a
$1 billion small-scale privatization program, mostly through auctions. Third, the method
by which most medium and large SOEs were privatized was the large-scale privatization
program, accounting for about $30 billion in asset value (Dyba and Svejnar, 1995).19 We
analyze the large-scale privatization program.17Note that if the weight on efficiency or revenue is positive, then transaction costs will be relevant for the
privatization decision.
18We are grateful to one of the referees for asking us to clarify this point.
19Kotrba (1995) states that the total book value of capital in the Czech Republic in 1990 was equal to 2604
billion Czech crowns and the book value of firms privatized under the large-scale program was more than 50% of
this amount (p. 164). The total book value of joint stock companies was over 86% of the total book value of firms
privatized in the large-scale program (Table 8.5, p. 166). The firms in our regression sample are these joint stock
companies.
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divided into two waves and a variety of methods were employed, reflecting several goals
proclaimed by the government—speed, fairness, revenue maximization, and public
support. In particular, for most firms the government allocated some shares into the
voucher scheme for support, speed, and fairness. It sold directly or through sealed bids the
other shares and in this process the price (and hence revenue) was usually the main
criterion for picking a given bid given that a firm had been chosen for privatization.
Within each category of shares, sequencing was an issue and transactions were carried
out over time. Reflecting this strategy, firms were allocated by the government for
privatization in the first wave at the end of April 1992 and shares were made available to
new owners at the end of May 1993. In the second wave, the privatization projects were
approved at the end of 1993 and shares were made available to new owners toward the end
of 1995. The approximately 2-year interval between the two waves is consistent with our
model of sequencing in Section 2.
As mentioned above, the large-scale privatization program employed several privatiza-
tion methods. The most common was a transformation of firms into joint stock companies
and the subsequent privatization of their shares. Joint stock firms accounted for about
77% of the privatization revenues received by the Czech government.20 About 350 firms
were sold for cash in the large-scale privatization program, raising about $8 billion in
privatization revenues (World Bank, 1999). In terms of share value, 20% to 30% of all the
shares of joint stock companies were sold to foreign and domestic buyers for cash through
direct sales, tenders, or financial intermediaries (World Bank, 1999). The revenues from
these sales went directly to the government and our focus on revenue maximization as a
government objective is consistent with this institutional feature. In some firms, a fraction
of shares was sold for cash, and another fraction was distributed through a voucher
privatization scheme. According Mejstrik et al. (1997, p. 61), voucher privatization
accounted for 37% of the total book value of state-owned assets.
The government also retained shares averaging 20–25% of the share value being
privatized. Some of these shares were used to meet restitution claims, while the rest were
sold subsequently in the secondary market or to strategic investors (Mejstrik et al., 1997;
World Bank, 1999). Information on the percentage of shares of each firm sold through the
various channels is not publicly available. However, we observe information on which
firms were privatized in the first wave and which were left for later. In our empirical work
we use this information to analyze the sequencing of privatization.
The voucher privatization scheme was an important component of each wave of the
large-scale privatization program. Under this scheme, every Czech citizen over 18 could
buy a book of vouchers containing 1000 investment points for a nominal fee of $34.
Citizens could use these voucher points to bid directly for shares, or they could transfer the
points to investment privatization funds (IPFs) that bid for shares on their behalf.
Although the government did not receive revenues from the shares distributed through
vouchers, voucher privatization helped create widespread support for the reforms. Thus,
focus on public goodwill as a government objective is relevant for the Czech Republic (and
the other economies that used a voucher scheme). The fact that the government privatized20Examples of joint stock companies in our data that were sold for cash include Skoda (automobile) sold to
Volkswagen, Tabak Kutna Hora (tobacco) sold to Philip Morris, and Cokoladovny (chocolate) sold to Nestle.
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program suggests that the government had multiple objectives.
In the first wave, nearly two-thirds of the participating public invested their vouchers in
nearly 450 IPFs, with the 14 largest IPFs collecting over 78% of the voucher points
remitted to the funds (World Bank, 1999). Many of the largest funds were created and
operated by local banks that temporarily remained majority state-owned.21 The control of
the largest IPFs by majority state-owned banks was an unexpected outcome for the Czech
government since it, unlike the Polish government, left the creation of IPFs to market
forces.22 There is every indication that the government expected voucher privatization to
constitute a legitimate transfer of ownership to private owners (World Bank, 1999).
4. Data, specification, and empirical results
4.1. Data
We use a large data set of firms sold in the Czech large-scale privatization program. The
data have several notable advantages. First, they capture the important large-scale
privatization program that was clearly divided into two non-overlapping waves. Second,
they cover the population of medium and large industrial firms rather than a smaller
(possibly non-random) sub-sample. Third, the data permit a clear identification of which
firms were privatized early and which ones later. Fourth, the Czech data are of relatively
good quality — a feature that is important since it is often difficult to obtain dependable
firm-level data in transition economies.
Our original data set contains quarterly and annual observations, starting in 1992, on
the population of all industrial firms with 25 or more workers, or approximately 2500
firms.23 The data were reported by firms to the Czech Statistical Office and contain
information from balance sheets and profit and loss statements. The reported variables
include sales, production, employment, average wages, total wage expenditures,
accounting profits, and two-digit industry classification. Regional identification is not
available.
From this data set we exclude approximately 750 firms that were either restituted to
previous owners or privatized in the small-scale privatization program. Restitutions could
be claimed during a period of several years, and the government allowed considerable
latitude for the prior owners to submit their claims. Unlike the large-scale program, there
was no explicit sequencing in the small-scale privatization effort. Small-scale privatization21Like mutual fund companies in the United States, IPFs in the Czech Republic were expected to diversify risk
for individual investors by investing in many firms. Fund involvement resulted in potentially concentrated control
over managers, but some have argued that the conflict of interest resulting from bank-owned funds owning firms
that were indebted to these banks prevented meaningful restructuring. It was not until after the recession of 1997
that the government began to address these issues and undertook banking sector reforms. The last remaining
state-owned bank, Komercni Banka, was privatized to French Societe Generale in 2001.
22However, the government passed a law prohibiting investment funds from gaining a majority stake in any
firm: a fund could not own more than 20% of the shares of a single firm, nor could funds established by the same
founder buy more than 20% of the same firm.
23Since we are dealing with the population of large- and medium-size firms in a given country, one may think of
statistical inference as reflecting a draw from the universe of possible economies undergoing large-scale
privatization in central and Eastern Europe. Alternatively, to justify the use of standard errors one can turn to the
concept of ‘Super-populations’ used in survey research, see, e.g. Hartley and Sielken (1975).
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government units more than sequencing. The small-scale firms are also not comparable to
the firms privatized in the two waves of the large-scale program because they have
significantly smaller asset size, employment, and output.24 Since $30 billion worth of assets
were privatized in the large-scale program, compared with $1 billion in the small-scale
program, by focusing on the former program we are analyzing the privatization of the bulk
of the property in the Czech Republic.
We also exclude about 250 cooperatives and 37 electric and water utility companies. The
cooperatives account for 1.8% of total output and 3% of the total wage bill of the sample
of 2500 firms. Cooperatives were not privatized in the large-scale privatization. Electric
and water utilities were considered strategic and retained under state ownership at this
stage of the privatization process. The excluded utility companies account for 0.6% of
total output and 1.5% of the total wage bill of the total sample. These exclusions yield data
on 1470 firms that went through the large-scale privatization program. For the purposes of
our analysis, we need annual and first quarter 1992 values for sales, value of output,
average wages, labor force, accounting profits, and industry classification for each firm.
After deleting firms with missing values, we obtain our group of 1121 firms. Note that
these firms account for over 78% of sales and 73% of the wage bill of the total sample. Of
these firms, 664 were privatized in the first wave of the large-scale privatization process and
457 were privatized in the second wave.
In comparison, published studies of the effect of privatization on firm behavior in
transition economies tend to use survey data on relatively small samples of firms. For
example: Frydman et al. (1999) use a sample of about 200 firms; Barberis et al. (1996) use a
similar size sample in their study of Russian shops; Bilsen and Konings (1998) use survey
data on about 400 firms divided among Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary; Grosfeld and
Nivet (1997) use a sample of 173 of the largest 500 companies in Poland; and Claessens and
Djankov (1999) use data on approximately 700 manufacturing firms from the Czech
Republic.
4.2. Empirical specification
In Section 2, we consider alternative government objectives that may determine the
sequencing of firms for privatization. Of course, the government may care about several or
all of these objectives. As we show in Section 2.6, we can think of the government as having
a weighting function over the objectives or over the observable variables that reflect or
capture these objectives. Alternatively, government decisions may be viewed as the result
of bargaining between competing groups, and the overall objective function weighs the
utility of competing groups. The weights would depend on the bargaining power of the
individual groups (Svejnar, 1982; Prasnikar et al., 1994). The probit equations that we
estimate below may be interpreted as estimating such a weighting function over the
observable variables.
We estimate probit equations where the dependent variable is coded one if a firm is
privatized in the first wave and zero if it is privatized in the second wave. We choose our




Theoretical predictions of models of privatization
Theory Variablea Definition Sign
(1) Maximizing Pareto efficiency (Q/LW/L)i Value of average productaverage wage 
(QW)i Value of outputtotal wage bill 
PROFITi Accounting profit 
MKSHAREi Market share 




(3) Minimizing political cost (Q/LW/L)i +
(QW)i +
PROFITi +
EMPGR Employment growth rate in industry
between 1991 and 1992
+
(4) Maximizing efficiency through
informational gainsb
CMEA Demand shock industry dummy +








aAn i subscript denotes a firm specific variable.
bThis is the Glaeser and Scheinkman (1996) model.
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sell the least profitable firms first. However, the public goodwill, political cost, and revenue
maximization models predict that the government will want to sell the more profitable
firms first. To investigate this issue, we use (separately) annual 1992 values of three
alternative variables as indicators of profitability: PROFIT (accounting profits); (QW)
(difference between the value of total output and the total wage bill); and (Q/LW/L)
(difference between the value of average product of labor and the average wage), where L
stands for employment.25 The profitability variables complement one another. Accounting
profits capture all of the input costs but may be subject to reporting error, while (QW)
and (Q/LW/L) underestimate total cost (because they ignore other inputs) but allow us
to focus directly on the relationship between revenues and labor cost.26 We also use an
explanatory variable MKSHARE measuring the firm’s market share in the industry (ratio
of firm sales to industry sales) as a proxy for profitability.27 The Pareto efficiency model
predicts that all these variables should have negative coefficients while the other models
(except Glaeser Scheinkman (GS)) predict that the coefficients should be positive.25We include the different measures of profit separately so as to avoid potential multicollinearity problems.
26Assets are reported only for a small number of firms in the data and including them would greatly reduce our
sample size.
27Another variable that may affect performance is the cost of capital post-privatization, which we do not
observe. Firms inherited their fixed capital from the communist era and there was little difference in the tax
treatment of firms in different regions and industries at this time.
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early since they offer lower efficiency gains from privatization suggests that MKSHARE
should have a negative coefficient. Note that this prediction is consistent with the Pareto
efficiency model but not the other models. The GS model has no prediction with regard to
firm profitability conditional on market share. We test the GS predictions regarding which
industries should be privatized early to reap the informational gains from privatization by
creating two dummy variables. The first dummy variable is CMEA, which is coded one for
industries most affected by the break-up of the Soviet common trading area known as the
CMEA and zero otherwise. Analyzing the effect of demand uncertainty is relevant because
of what is known as the CMEA shock. The trading system of the Soviet bloc countries
began disintegrating in 1990 and was dismantled in 1991, resulting in a collapse of trade.
Exports between Central European countries fell 25% between 1989 and 1990 and were
still 13% lower than the previous year in 1993. The trend is similar for exports between
Central European countries and the former Soviet Union. Industries that relied heavily on
exports to these markets experienced considerable demand uncertainty after the collapse of
the CMEA. To identify industries that faced demand uncertainty following the collapse of
the CMEA, we selected industries that experienced declining exports and output after
1991, using evidence from the statistical yearbooks of the Czech Republic and the detailed
discussion of this issue in Bohata et al. (1995). The industries included in this category are
mining of non-energy materials, mining of metal ores, other mining, textiles, wood
products, pulp and paper products, and other non-metallic mineral products. In selecting
the CMEA industries, we were conservative and did not include industries, such as
production of transportation equipment, that were also somewhat significant exporters
and at the same time were becoming technologically obsolete. Had we included these other
sectors, we would have captured even greater changes in sales and export/sales ratios.28
An important question arises as to whether there was not a fast replacement of the
decreasing Czech–CMEA trade by Czech–German trade.29 While such a reorientation
occurred, it was relatively slow for three reasons. First, there was a different composition
of Czech exports to the ‘‘hard’’ markets in the West and the ‘‘soft’’ markets in the East.
Czechoslovakia’s exports to CMEA resembled a pattern of exports of a developed
industrial country (high share of machinery in exports), while its pattern of trade with
developed countries (Germany in particular) was more similar to that of a developing
country (exporting a high share of fuels and mineral raw materials). In fact, in the very first
stage of the transition, Czechoslovakia increased its exports of raw materials to the West
and suffered a decline in exports of machinery to the East. The second reason for a
relatively slow reorientation was the low initial base of exports to the West. In 1989, the
value of Czechoslovak trade with the European Economic Community was equal to only
about 18% of total Czechoslovak exports, while exports to CMEA amounted to 55% of
total exports. Hence, a substantial increase in the volume of trade was necessary to
compensate for the loss of CMEA markets. Third, the commodities exported East were28Our discussions with managers and policy makers indicate that the Czech Republic (and until the end of 1992,
Czechoslovakia) was a small enough economy that every firm knew the relevant suppliers of inputs and users of
output. Unlike in trade with the CMEA and the West, firms did not use the services of state trading firms for
domestic purchases and deliveries. The uncertainties hence came primarily from the collapse and final abolishing
of the CMEA. Note that the Finnish economy experienced a similar decline to that of the Central European
countries on account of its trade decline with the CMEA.
29We are grateful to one of the referees to bringing this point to our attention.
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therefore exported to CMEA markets because they were not able to sell at Western markets
and their reliance on Eastern markets often increased as their production became more
obsolete. Simply switching the destination of exports from CMEA to Germany was
therefore often not viable. The Skoda automobile producer is a case in point. In the 1980s,
Skoda had a reputation for low quality and had to leave some West European markets for
non-compliance with environmental regulations. In 1991, it was sold to Volkswagen and
only as a result of sizable investments could it return to western markets. In fact, the first
model that was competitive on the Western markets was produced only in 1996.
Our second dummy variable, DOWN, is coded one for downstream (processed goods)
industries and zero otherwise. Following the predictions of GS, the DOWN category
includes food, tobacco, textiles, leather, footwear, paper, publishing, electronic machinery
and equipment, and transportation. GS show that privatizing downstream will be more
efficient than upstream privatization if the retail sector is private. In the Czech Republic,
retail and other service-oriented firms were privatized in the small-scale program prior to
the start of the large-scale privatization. The GS model suggests that firms in the CMEA
and DOWN industries should be privatized first, since these firms are likely to benefit the
most from increased responsiveness to information about demand conditions after
privatization. In 1991, the CMEA industries had an export/sales ratio of 27.9%, while the
non-CMEA industries had an export/sales ratio of 18.2%. Similarly, the DOWN
industries had a 1991 export/sales ratio of 24.7%, while the non-DOWN industries had
an export/sales ratio of 14.4%.30
Finally, the political cost model predicts that the government will privatize more
profitable firms first. It also predicts that the government will privatize firms in industries
with strong labor demand first. We use the industry employment growth rate to proxy
current labor market conditions in the industry. We expect the coefficient on this variable
to be positive (stronger labor demand in an industry lowers the political cost of privatizing
firms in that industry). If demand conditions are not important in determining the
probability of privatization, this casts doubt on the political costs model and allows one to
distinguish it from the public goodwill and revenue maximization objectives. However, we
should note that it might be hard to identify the effects of demand conditions on
privatization for two reasons. First, we do not have the locations of the firm’s plants and
thus cannot exploit regional variation in employment. Instead, we use industry-level
employment growth. Specifically, we use the difference between 1991 and 1992 industry
employment rates, EMPGR, since these are not affected by the first wave of large-scale
privatization. Second, although employment fell by an average of 11% between 1991 and30We wanted to include a variable for industries facing cost uncertainty, since GS recommend that these firms
are good candidates for early privatization, but we could not obtain statistical evidence and the anecdotal
evidence was inconsistent. The primary source of uncertainty facing firms in transition economies has been
fluctuating demand conditions. Therefore, both the CMEA and DOWN variables capture one of the most
significant sources of uncertainty affecting these firms. Between 1991 and 1993, firms in the DOWN industries
suffered a 21.6% decline in production, while firms in the non-DOWN industries experienced a 15.3% decline.
Firms in CMEA and non-CMEA industries faced a 19.7% and 18.7% decline, respectively. During the same
period, the DOWN and non-DOWN industries experienced a 12.0% and 58.6% increase in exports/sales ratio,
respectively, while the CMEA and non-CMEA industries experienced a 27.0% and 29.6% increase in the export/
sales ratio, respectively. As mentioned above, the CMEA versus non-CMEA differential would be greater if we
included in the CMEA category industries such as production of transportation equipment.
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precisely estimate the effect of labor market conditions. (The standard deviation of
employment growth is 4.1% in our data.)
We start by estimating the parameters of the following probit equation:
yi ¼ a0 þ a1ðQ=LW=LÞi þ a2 MKSHAREi þ a3 CMEA
þ a4 DOWN þ a5 EMPGRþ ui, ð6Þ
where ui has a standard normal distribution and y

i is a latent index. A firm is privatized if
yi is greater than zero. To test the sensitivity of our results to the measure used for profits
(or the degree of inefficiency), we replaceðQ=LW=LÞi with ðQW Þi in Eq. (6) while
retaining MKSHAREi:
yi ¼ b0 þ b1ðQW Þi þ b2 MKSHAREi þ b3 CMEA
þ b4 DOWN þ b5 EMPGRþ i. ð7Þ
Finally, to investigate further the sensitivity of our results to the choice of profit
variables, we replace (QW)i with accounting profits PROFITi and estimate:
yi ¼ g0 þ g1 PROFITi þ g2 MKSHAREi
þ g3 CMEAþ g4 DOWN þ g5 EMPGRþ vi. ð8Þ
Table 1 contains a summary of the predictions of the theoretical models developed in
Section 2 and it also lists the variables used to capture these predictions.
4.3. Econometric issues
In order to ensure that the explanatory variables capture firm performance before the
firms were turned over to new owners starting in the spring of 1993, we use 1992 annual
values for the firm-specific independent variables: ðQ=LW=LÞi; ðQW Þi, PROFITi
and MKSHAREi We do not have data prior to the first quarter of 1992. There may be an
endogeneity problem for some of the 1992 annual variables if their values were affected by
the knowledge of whether the firm would be privatized in the first wave. This information
became available at the end of April 1992 and thus the values from May to December 1992
could be affected by whether the firm was chosen for privatization. In principle, the future
owners should not have been able to affect the values of these variables since the actual
transfer of shares to new owners did not occur until May 1993 or later and existing
evidence suggests that little restructuring occurred in the second half of 1992. However, to
allow for the possibility that in practice the annual 1992 variables were affected by the
firm’s privatization status, we test the null hypothesis for each equation that 1992 variables
used in the equation are exogenous. If we reject the exogeneity of a variable, we treat it as
endogenous using the 1992 first quarter data as instrumental variables.
To investigate this issue, we test for the endogeneity of the annual 1992 firm-specific
values using the test outlined in Rivers and Vuong (1988). Specifically, we estimate first
stage equations for each of the annual 1992 firm-specific variables using all of the 1992 first
quarter values of the firm-specific variables as instruments.31 The model is well identified in31Note that this instrument will still be valid if firms knew that privatization was coming, as long as they did not
know which firms were more likely to be privatized (in terms of the error in the index function for the firm being
privatized).
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first stage equations are always below 0.01. The first stage results are reported in
Appendix Table A1. Under the assumption of multivariate normality, we then enter
both the respective 1992 annual values and their residuals from the first-stage into the
relevant probit equation. We test the null hypothesis that the annual values are exogenous
using Wald tests for whether the coefficients on the residuals are significantly different
from zero, either individually or jointly. We find that the null hypothesis of exogeneity
is rejected only for accounting profits. Thus, when we estimate Eq. (8), we also enter a
fitted value for accounting profits and adjust the standard errors to account for this
fitted value.32
While studies in the transition and development literatures commonly use data reported
by firms in balance sheets and income statements, the variable measuring accounting
profits may arguably be affected by inappropriate accounting methods. We address this
issue by using (as other proxies for profitability) variables such as the difference between
total output and the wage bill, the firm’s market share, and the difference between the
average product of labor and the average wage.33 There also may be concerns that our
explanatory variables are based on prices from the Communist era and hence are largely
irrelevant in predicting firms’ performance in a market economy. Fortunately, most prices
were liberalized on 1 January 1991, the 20% temporary import surcharge was eliminated at
the end of 1991, and the average import tariff was set at a mere 5%. Therefore, our 1992
data already reflect world prices in the context of modest inflation. Finally, the question
arises as to whether stock market prices could be used to measure profitability. However,
these prices report the post-privatization, rather than the pre-privatization, performance of
firms and hence cannot be used to predict whether a firm is privatized in the first wave.
Moreover, this variable is not even available in 1993 for firms not privatized in the first
wave.
4.4. Empirical results
In Table 2 we present the mean 1992 values of the explanatory variables. Column 1
contains the values for all firms, while columns 2 and 3 contain the values for firms
privatized during the first wave and the second wave, respectively. Column 4 contains the t-
statistic for the null hypothesis that the mean values in columns 2 and 3 are equal. Note that
firms privatized in the first wave are, on average, more likely to be in downstream industries
and have higher average values of accounting profits, average product minus average wage,
value of output minus wage bill, and market share. These firms are also more likely to have
been affected by the collapse of the CMEA, but the difference between the first and second
wave firms for this variable is not statistically significant. Finally, there is very little
difference in mean industrial employment growth between the two types of firms.
Table 3 presents our results for the specifications given by Eqs. (6), (7), and (8). In the
first three columns of Table 3, we report our results using annual 1992 values for the firm-
specific variables. The reported coefficients provide the marginal effect or the change in the32Note that this estimated coefficient implicitly uses a different normalization (such normalizations are inherent
in the use of a probit model). As a result, the coefficient obtained by simultaneous equation methods is a lower
bound on the true value of the coefficient.




Means of principal variables in 1992 by privatization status of firms
Variable Values for





H0: (2) ¼ (3)
1 2 3 4
CMEA 0.255 (0.013) 0.267 (0.017) 0.239 (0.020) 1.06
DOWN 0.678 (0.014) 0.702 (0.018) 0.643 (0.022) 2.06
PROFITi 37.9 (5.42) 47.2 (8.31) 24.5 (5.53) 2.06

(Q/LW/L)I 0.505 (0.016) 0.542 (0.022) 0.452 (0.021) 2.78
(QW)i 396.8 (37.62) 505.4 (61.07) 238.9 (23.63) 3.50
MKSHAREi 0.020 (0.002) 0.024 (0.002) 0.013 (0.002) 3.53

EMPGR 11.14 (0.124) 11.11 (0.160) 11.18 (0.195) 0.286
Number of
observations
1121 664 457 –
Standard deviations of means are in parentheses.
Note: Profits, value of total output, wage bill, firm sales, and industry sales are measured in millions of 1992 Czech
crowns, where 1 US dollar was equal to about 30 Czech crowns at the time. The firm-specific variables are
calculated using annual 1992 observations and are denoted by an i subscript.
Significant at the 5 percent level.
Significant at the 1 percent level.
N. Gupta et al. / European Economic Review 52 (2008) 183–208202probability for an infinitesimal change in each independent, continuous variable and, the
discrete change in the probability for the dummy variables. The standard errors of these
effects are reported in the table. We also report the Wald and likelihood-ratio test statistics
from the Rivers and Vuong (1988) exogeneity tests jointly and individually for the annual
firm-specific variables in each specification. As mentioned earlier, we reject the null
hypothesis of exogeneity for the accounting profits variable only, and in column 4 we treat
accounting profits as endogenous.34
In column 1 of Table 3, both CMEA and DOWN have positive and statistically
significant coefficients (at the 10 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively), as predicted by
the GS model. The coefficient of the variable measuring the difference between the value of
the average product of labor and the average wage, ðQ=LW=LÞi, has a positive sign and
is also statistically significant. The results suggest that if a firm was moved from the 10th
percentile to 90th percentile of ðQ=LW=LÞi, the probability of privatization would rise
from .462 to .632, or by almost 40%, when the other variables are set at their mean values.
This result is consistent with the government minimizing political costs, as well as
maximizing privatization revenues and public goodwill; it is inconsistent with the
government maximizing Pareto efficiency.
The coefficient on the market share variable captures two effects. While dead-weight loss
may be lower if firms with monopoly power are not privatized early (as recommended by34For the sake of completeness, we also estimated the probit equations using the first quarter 1992 data, rather
than annual 1992 data, for the firm-specific variables. These estimates are similar to those based on annual data
and we report them in Appendix Table A2. The only difference is that the coefficient on accounting profits is not
statistically significant, perhaps because this variable is subject to seasonal fluctuations.
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Table 3
Estimating the probability of privatization.
The dependent variable equals one if the firm is privatized in the first wave: Firm-specific RHS variables are
annual 1992 observations
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Rivers and Vuong LR joint test for exogeneity



























Note: The reported coefficients provide the marginal effect or the change in the probability for an infinitesimal
change in each independent, continuous variable and, the discrete change in the probability for the dummy
variables. In columns 1–3 the firm-specific variables (denoted by an i subscript) are treated as exogenous. In
column 4, annual profit is treated as endogenous. The first stage results are reported in Appendix Table A1.
A constant is included but not reported. The sample contains 1121 firms. See notes to Table 2.
Standard errors are in parentheses.
N. Gupta et al. / European Economic Review 52 (2008) 183–208 203GS), this variable may also proxy profitability. Hence, in the case of a Pareto efficiency
maximizing government we expect the estimated coefficient to have a negative sign.
However, if the government is primarily concerned with revenues and public goodwill then
the estimated coefficient should have a positive sign. We find a positive and statistically
significant coefficient on market share, suggesting that the latter objectives dominate.
Further, the coefficient on the industry employment growth variable, which measures
labor demand conditions affecting political costs, is not statistically significant at standard
confidence levels, casting doubt on the political costs model. As a result, we attribute the
positive coefficients on the profit variables to revenue or public goodwill maximization.
In column 2 of Table 3 we use market share and the difference between the value of total
output and the wage bill as proxies for profitability. These results are quite similar to those
in column 1. These results imply that if a firm was moved from the 10th percentile to 90th
percentile of ðQW Þi, the probability of privatization would rise from .558 to .658, or by
almost twenty percent. In column 3 we replace the difference between the value of total
output and the wage bill with accounting profits. The results are similar to those in
columns 1 and 2 except that the coefficient on accounting profits has a statistically
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rejected. Thus, in column 4 we treat accounting profits as endogenous. The results are
similar to those in columns 1 through 3, although treating accounting profits as endogenous
substantially increases its coefficient and statistical significance.35 (Treating accounting
profits as endogenous has little effect on the other coefficients.) These results imply that if a
firm was moved from the 10th percentile to 90th percentile of accounting profits, the
probability of privatization would rise from 46.4% to 63.4%, an increase of about 37%.
Finally, to examine the possibility that Eqs. (6), (7), and (8) are too rich to identify the
effect of the employment growth variable, we consider a narrower specification that
eliminates the industry dummy variables CMEA and DOWN. These results are quite
similar to those in Table 3, and the coefficient of the employment growth variable remains
statistically insignificant.36 As noted earlier, one possible explanation is that the relatively
low level of variation in this variable across industries leads to an insignificant coefficient
on this variable.5. Conclusion
In the numerous privatization programs around the world, governments have virtually
never privatized all firms simultaneously. This raises the issue of how governments
sequence privatizations strategically on the basis of their objectives. Many economists
would see increasing Pareto efficiency as a primary goal of governments. Glaeser and
Scheinkman (1996) suggest that governments may maximize the efficient flow of
information in the economy. We discuss additional theories of privatization that relate
to other government objectives as seen by economists, political scientists and sociologists:
Maximizing public goodwill, minimizing political costs, and maximizing privatization
revenues. These models provide concrete predictions about the sequencing of privatization
in any transitional economy. We test these predictions using micro-data from the Czech
large-scale privatization program.
We find strong evidence that the Czech government privatized first firms that were more
profitable, firms in downstream industries, and firms in industries subject to greater demand
uncertainty. Privatizing more profitable firms first is inconsistent with maximizing Pareto
efficiency, but it is consistent with the government objectives of maximizing privatization
revenues and public goodwill. On the other hand, while a government minimizing political
costs of unemployment may also privatize profitable firms first, the other important
implication of the political cost model that employment growth in the firm’s industry
should affect sequencing is not supported by our data, which weakens support for the
political cost objective considerably. Our finding that firms in downstream industries and in
industries with greater demand uncertainty were more likely to be privatized early suggests
that this privatization strategy improved the responsiveness of SOEs to market shocks,
increasing efficiency due to informational gains (Glaeser and Scheinkman, 1996). However,
in contrast to the GS prediction but consistent with the general evidence regarding
profitability, firms with higher market share were more likely to be privatized first.35One could argue that variables such as PROFITi or (QW)i may simply be picking up a size effect, although
there is no theoretical reason to include size. Our results, however, are very similar when we use (Q/LW/L)i,
which is independent of firm size.
36The results are available upon request.
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these objectives in countries other than the Czech Republic. Such estimation and testing
will build a body of knowledge concerning the actual priorities of governments in these
economies. Since many of these countries will have more variable employment growth
than the Czech Republic, this will also allow researchers to better assess the role of political
costs in these economies. Needless to say, other complications will arise as one considers
data from other economies. For example, manager and worker buyouts were fairly
common in Russia, where about 55% of firms were sold by this method (World Bank,
1996). For these cases of insider privatization it may not be easy to predict the
government’s sequencing priorities, since privatization could be an outcome of joint
bargaining between the government, managers, and workers.
Evidence from other countries suggests that our framework is relevant in general for
investigating government objectives in privatization. For example, Dinc and Gupta (2006)
find that in India more profitable firms are likely to be sold earlier than others. Further,
government objectives in privatization have been shown to be relevant for the Polish
privatization program (De Fraja and Roberts, 2007), and for Chinese privatization (Guo
and Yao, 2005).
In addition to providing key evidence on the nature of the privatization process, our
results have important implications for studies evaluating the effect of privatization. Many
of these studies measure gains from privatization by comparing the performance of
privatized firms to firms that are still in the public sector. Such comparisons are valid only
if firms are randomly chosen for privatization. For example, if the government selectively
privatizes better firms (as our results suggest), it would not be surprising to see these
privatized firms perform better than firms that remain public, even if privatization had no
effect on firm performance. Thus, our results suggest that it is necessary to investigate the
possibility of selection bias (Heckman, 1979) in such an evaluation. A similar statistical
problem arises in studies examining the effect on firm performance of the length of time
since privatization. Our result that more profitable firms are likely to be privatized early
implies that unobserved characteristics that make the firms more profitable may be
correlated with the length of time they have been privatized.37Acknowledgments
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Appendix
For first-stage estimates of annual 1992 and full model estimates of first quarter 1992
data, please see Tables A1 and A2.Table A1
First stage estimates of the annual 1992 firm-specific variables
Explanatory variables using
quarter 1, 1992 observations
for firm-specific variables
Dependent variables using annual 1992 observations

























































R2 0.919 0.956 0.958 0.585
Number of observations 1121 1121 1121 1121
Note: Dependent variables are the annual observations from 1992. The right-hand side firm-specific variables,
denoted by an i subscript, are observations from the first quarter of 1992. All equations include a constant (not
shown). See notes to Table 2.
Standard errors are in parentheses.
Table A2
Estimates of the full model using first quarter 1992 data
Variable 1 2 3
CMEA 0.063* (0.035) 0.070** (0.035) 0.058* (0.035)
DOWN 0.092 (0.034) 0.102*** (0.034) 0.099*** (0.034)
MKSHAREi 0.468*** (0.140) 0.294* (0.155) 0.497*** (0.145)
EMPGR 0.001 (0.004) 0.002 (0.004) 0.004 (0.004)
(Q/LW/L)i 104 2.576** (1.284) – –
(QW)i 107 0.315*** (0.113) –
PROFITi 107 – – 0.015 (0.034)
Note: Firm-specific variables are observations from the first quarter of 1992. The reported coefficients provide the
marginal effect or the change in the probability for an infinitesimal change in each independent, continuous
variable and, the discrete change in the probability for the dummy variables. See notes to Table 2 and Table A1.
Standard errors are in parentheses.
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